Philosophy, Lately

Keeping up with the literature can be hard and trying to find the latest interesting developments is equally hard. Not to worry though, we’ll let you know what has been up with philosophy lately.

The installment for this series today is in the area of meta-ethics, with Nicolas Côté’s paper Humean Moral Realism Without Irony

To set the stage, note that moral realism, so understood, is the conjunction of three theses

(1) Moral statements are truth-apt This just means moral statements are capable of being true or false like other declarative statements

(2) Some moral statements are true This clause distinguishes moral realism from error theory which holds that all moral statements are false. Under moral realism, at least some of them are true

(3) The moral statements that are true, are true stance-independently Meaning that true moral statements are true regardless of what anyone feels or thinks about them (in other words. regardless of stances), such that everyone could agree that X is wrong but X still may be right stance independently

Now, “Humean” here refers to a theory of Humean rationality and psychology. We will keep this brief as Côté’ explains it as well but to put it succinctly, Humean rationality posits that reason is purely instrumental— a tool to calculate the best means to achieve your desires but incapable of determining what those desires should be. On this view, reason is the "slave of the passions," meaning it can guide you to your destination but cannot tell you where you ought to go.

Right off the bat you should see how the conjunction of these two concepts is interesting because they seem entirely perpendicular, almost contradictory! But you’ll be the judge of that, however. On to the paper

Côté begins by accepting the standard Humean theory of motivation: desires drive action, and beliefs alone are inert. However, he says this with a crucial psychological observation: human beings are not monolithic agents with a single, consistent set of desires. Instead, we are naturally divided between multiple "evaluative standpoints".

Through the mechanism of sympathy (interpreted through Adam Smith as "simulated perspective" rather than simple contagion), humans can occupy different viewpoints. We have our self-interested standpoint, but sympathy forces us to also see the world through the eyes of others, and eventually, through the eyes of an "impartial spectator".

This psychological richness creates two profound pragmatic problems for the human agent, borrowing from Philip Pettit:

Côté defends the view that ethics is the solution to these practical problems. He treats the integration of our internal standpoints as an exercise in "social choice theory," where the "voters" are the different standpoints within a single person's mind.

If you are a human being moved by the need for internal unity and social peace (which, Côté argues, sympathy and pragmatism ensure you are), you will naturally recognize certain constraints on how you integrate your values. Côté identifies seven "sentimentalist constraints" that any valid moral system must satisfy:

The other constraints arise from the need to solve the "Non-Universality Problem" (living with others):

Now the actual bread and butter of Côté’s paper is that these constraints transform subjective desires into objective moral facts. Which is the most important part of his paper

A major weakness of standard Humean Constructivism (like that of Sharon Street) is a sort of agent relativism. If a "fully rational Caligula" wants to torture people, and his desires are consistent, Constructivism must admit he is doing "right" by his own lights.

According to Côté, Caligula is not right. If Caligula is a human being sensitive to sympathy (even a little), he faces the Disunity Problem. A "dictatorial" solution (pure sadism) violates the Non-Dictatorship constraint. If Caligula lacks sympathy entirely (like a tiger or a shark), he does not face the problem of morality at all as he is not a moral agent (although Côté does not really give much motivation to accept this). Thus, we can objectively say Caligula is "wrong" (or outside the moral realm) without abandoning Humean psychology.

Expressivists like Simon Blackburn claim to be "realists" because they can say "It is a fact that kicking dogs is wrong." But they admit this "fact" is just a projection of their own attitude.

Côté’s model is supposed to be genuinely discovery-based. The "sentimentalist constraints" (Propensity for Peace, Rationality, etc.) are intersubjective insofar as we do not just invent them; we discover which moral codes satisfy them best.

Furthermore, moral claims are true if they describe a solution that best satisfies these constraints. Accordingly, the truth of a moral claim depends on whether it actually solves the coordination problems, not on whether we think it does. If we all believed slavery was good, we would be wrong, because slavery inherently generates conflict and violates the Propensity for Peace and Mutual Benefit.

Côté’s defense is robust because it requires no "spooky" metaphysics. It relies on:

This paper does have its issues. A significant vulnerability in the paper is how it handles agents who simply do not care about morality or sympathy (e.g., the "rational Caligula" or psychopaths). Standard moral realism usually claims that a cruel tyrant is objectively wrong, regardless of his internal desires. However, Côté concedes that if an agent lacks sympathy and is "locked into" a purely self-interested standpoint, his theory cannot say this agent is acting wrongly, indeed, this agent is “outside” of the moral space according to him. Therefore, the theory essentially admits that moral obligations do not apply to everyone which is frankly weird given realism

Also, consider the constraints he proposed. These seem to explicitly require that a valid moral system must favor peace and cooperation. Although, to Côté’s credit, he anticipates the objection that this looks like "cheating" or "moral requirements masquerading as... constraints on theory choice". Côté defends this by claiming peace is a pragmatic necessity for solving the "non-universality problem"; still, a skeptic could argue that this begs the question against worldviews that value conquest, dominion, or isolation over cooperation.

Côté’s Humean Moral Realism Without Irony offers a compelling path forward for those who are skeptical of supernatural morality but unsatisfied with moral relativism. It is quite an ambitious paper that combines two unlikely concepts in a fascinating way.

Check out his paper here: Humean Moral Realism Without Irony | The Journal of Ethics

That’s all folks.

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