Question for you: If you had a quarter and wanted candy from a machine that dispensed only red candy but didn’t want any from a machine that dispensed only green candy. Do you have a reason to put your quarter into the machine that dispensed red candy? You would probably say yes to this.
Now, if I asked you, “why would you have a reason for doing so” you would probably say something to the effect of, “because I had a desire for red candy and not for green ones” and that’s great, but we can take it a step further. What would it even mean for an agent to have a reason to φ (where φ is any action) if they do not have a desire to φ??
Think carefully about your answer to that question because it is essential to what will be discussed in this article and why this “Humean account” of reasons is so powerful against other normative frameworks. Trust me, this is completely underrated, and you’ll find it quite useful when used right
Reason and Desire
Many normative frameworks your opponent will use in the round will usually hinge on a sort of implied realism for moral obligations, the things that we ought to do (in the sense that many debaters use it) are categorical, meaning they apply to everyone in a way that is independent of any agent’s goals. For example, Jeffrey ought not make his sister sad despite wanting to annoy her.
Categorical: Categorical imperatives/obligations are commands you must follow irrespective of your desires and motives.
This makes sense intuitively, but it isn’t as straightforward as one would like to think.
First, separate two notions people blur in-round:
Motivating reason: what actually moves an agent.
Normative reason: what counts in favor of an action for that agent.
Humeans (and Williams-style internalists) claim these are tightly linked, almost inextricably so. If some alleged “reason” could not, even under ideal reflection and correction of mistakes, speak to your motivations at all, it is not a reason for you.
The internalist schema (Williams):
Let S be an agent’s “subjective motivational set” (desires, projects, commitments, values, aversions). Agent A has a reason to φ iff there is a sound deliberative route from S to φ. i.e., φ-ing would promote, express, or cohere with elements of S once misinformation and inference errors are corrected. On this view:
“A has reason to φ” = “φ would advance A’s suitably informed ends.”
That’s why your quarter goes in the red machine: you want red candy. If you had no desire related to red candy (or anything it instrumentally serves. e.g. pleasure, nostalgia, sugar, status, etc.), then absent some route from your actual ends to φ, there’s simply no reason for you to put the quarter in. Full stop.
As Wong puts it in his paper: “what point could a reason have if it is not capable of motivating the agent who has it?”
Definitions: Sound deliberation means reasoning from your existing desires, values, and commitments under ideal conditions. Having full information, making no logical mistakes, recognizing means–end relations, and resolving conflicts among ends. If, after this corrected process, an action would still advance your motivational set, then you have a genuine reason to do it
What this means for normative frameworks
So, how can you use this? If you’re a debater who is on a more senior level, then this can be incredibly useful as a unique argument to shake up your opponent. Most frameworks your opponent will run assume some kind of categorical “ought” that there are obligations that bind regardless of your desires. But the Humean account cuts this down such that if an “ought” does not connect to your motivational set under sound deliberation, then it isn’t really an “ought” or obligation for you at all as much as it would be, say, a demand of sorts
This makes categorical obligations highly suspect in round. If your opponent insists “you must maximize utility” or “you must respect rights,” you can press them: why must I, unless doing so connects to my aims or values under correction? If they cannot show that the obligation routes back to an agent’s motivational set, then by internalist standards, it isn’t a reason. It has no binding force.
On a Humean view, reasons are internal to agents, not imposed from the outside. That means most “ought”-heavy moral frameworks collapse unless they can demonstrate a bridge between their categorical demand and the actual motivational structure of agents. If they can’t do that, their framework rests on empty claims.
Now of course, you should use unique frameworks like these with caution because it is very easy for judges to be biased against them or see them as nonsense if not executed right, but this should be no problem for the brilliant readers of The Forensic Funnel
So next time you’re in a round and someone says, “You ought to…” pivot straight to theory with Humean reasons if you want and give them a round to remember
Happy debating,
The Forensic Funnel Team
